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NOTES
IS THE U.S. COMMITTED TO FAIR HOUSING?
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT REMAINS A
CRUCIAL PROBLEM

With the enactment of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the
Fair Housing Act),' Congress ordered an end to the pervasive problem of
discrimination in housing. Thus, a century after the Civil War, Congress
declared equal housing opportunity for all to be national policy.2 Yet, in
the eleven years during which the Fair Housing Act has been in effect,
discrimination in housing has not abated substantially.3 Instead, housing
1. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976)). [The
terms "Fair Housing Act," "The Act," and "Title VIII" will be used interchangeably
throughout this Note.] In 1967, it was estimated that 80% of the black population of metropolitan areas in the U.S. lived in central cities, while most new housing was constructed in
the suburbs. Hearingson S. 1358, S. 2114, andS. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 36 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]. By 1976, almost 5.6 million of the 21.2 million blacks
in metropolitan areas lived outside the central cities - an increase of 36.6% since 1970.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, URBAN AMERICA:
OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH,
CENT SUBURBANIZATION OF BLACKS:

U.S.

POLICIES AND PROBLEMS 8

(1978).

See

DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., RE-

How MUCH, WHO, AND WHERE? (Feb. 1979).

But

the increase in the suburban black population does not necessarily indicate an increase in
the number of integrated communities. For a detailed discussion of minority migration and
urban residential segregation, see UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY
YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 119-36 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as TWENTY YEARS]. In 1968, William J. Levitt, the nation's largest homebuilder, stated that
in the absence of a legal prohibition, discrimination was good business: "Integration has
certainly not hurt us [the housing industry]. . . [but] any homebuilder who chooses to operate on an open occupancy basis, where it is not customary or required by law, runs the grave
risk of losing business to his competitor who chooses to discriminate." 114 CONG. REC. 3421
(1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale quoting William J. Levitt). See also Dubofsky, FairHousing A Legislative History anda Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969); Note, The Federal
FairHousing Requirements. Title V1i of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733.
2. The preamble to Title VIII states: "It is the policy of the United States to provide,
within constitutional limits, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. §
3601 (1976).
3. The blatant forms of discriminatory housing practices such as "whites only" adver-

tising have abated, however. See ProposedAmendments to the FairHousing Act." Hearings
on HR. 3504 and HR. 7787 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the House
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discrimination remains a critical national problem. A recent HUD-sponsored study found that in the current housing market, a black homeseeker
who visits four different real estate agents has a seventy-five percent
chance of encountering discrimination when attempting to find rental
housing and a sixty-two percent chance of encountering discrimination
when attempting to buy housing.4
Responsibility for discrimination in housing is shared by real estate and
insurance companies, banks, governmental units, and individuals.
Through various discriminatory techniques, of which racial steering now is
considered preeminent,' these groups have seriously limited housing opportunity. The greatest problem underlying the current housing situation,
however, is a weak fair housing law which has been ineffectual in its objective to eliminate housing discrimination.
Historically, the federal government has been involved in efforts toprevent discrimination in housing only for a short time. Unfortunately, the
government's earliest programs dealing with housing were "carried out
under policies which . . . were aggressively discriminatory ...."' Later,
during the 1950's, the government retreated from official policies that
openly advocated housing discrimination. 7 Nevertheless, the first significant step taken by the government against discrimination in federally assisted housing was in 1962 with President Kennedy's Executive Order on
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1978) (statement of Edward L. Holmgren)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
4.

DIVISION OF EVALUATION, OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF

HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES SURVEY (1978) (prepared by
the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing) [hereinafter cited as NCDH
SURVEY]. Overall, the study found that blacks were discriminated against in 30% of the
rental transactions and in 22% of the sales transactions which were monitored. See note 75
infra.
5. FairHousingAmendmentsAct of 1979." Hearingson HR. 2540 Before the Subcomm.
on the Const. ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., IstSess. 174 (1979) (statement of Robert C. Weaver) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings]. "Racial steering" refers to
a practice whereby a real estate broker directs the buyer, on the basis of race, toward a
particular house or neighborhood because of its racial composition or fails to inform a buyer
of suitable housing in other neighborhoods. For a thorough evaluation of racial steering as
it relates to Title VIII, see Note, Racial Steering- The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85
YALE L. J. 808 (1976) (Title VIII's colorblind standard requiring real estate brokers to treat
customers equally without regard to race prohibits virtually all racial steering). See also
Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (any attempt by real estate brokers to
influence prospective buyers on a racial basis violates § 804(a) of Title VIII).
6. M. SLOANE, FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY, printed in
SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 131, 132 (Comm. Print 1976). See notes 28-42 and accompanying text infra.
7. See M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 139.
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Equal Opportunity in Housing.8 Executive Order 11,063 had a very limited impact on housing discrimination, however, since it covered only
about one percent of the nation's housing stock at the time of its promulgation.9
The second important effort by the government to eliminate discrimination in federally assisted housing was the enactment of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.10 Like Executive Order 11,063, the impact of Title VI
on housing discrimination has been limited because it applies to only onehalf of one percent of the nation's housing."
In contrast to the government's early history of discriminatory housing
policies and its subsequent, but inadequate, efforts to remedy the problem,
the enactment of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 196812 represents the
most important and far-reaching stand by the government against housing
discrimination to date. Unlike Executive Order 11,063 and Title VI, which
prohibit housing discrimination in federally assisted programs, Title VIII
was enacted to cover the private market.' 3 Title VIII may be enforced in
one of three ways. The Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) may investigate complaints and resolve them
through "conference, conciliation, and persuasion."' 14 Enforcement authority also is assigned to the Department of Justice and permits the Attorney General to litigate private housing discrimination cases only where
there is a "pattern or practice" of discrimination or where the complaint
presents issues of general public importance. ' 5 Finally, an individual complainant may expend his or her own resources and time and act as "private
8. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. § 652 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). HUD recently proposed rules relating to discrimination in federally
assisted housing. See Nondiscrimination and Equal Opportunity in Housing Under Executive Order 11,063, 44 Fed. Reg. 55,522 (1979) (to be codified in 24 C.F.R. § 1070). See notes

43-45 and accompanying text infra. See also M.
9. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 143.

SLOANE,

supra note 6, at 142-43.

10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-5 (1976).
11. See notes 46-51 and accompanying text infra.

12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976).
13. State statutes prohibiting discrimination in private housing first appeared in 1959.
See Pearl & Terner, Survey. FairHousing Laws - Designfor Equal Opportunity, 16

STAN.

L. REV. 849, 850 (1964).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976). In 1977, HUD received more than 3,000 complaints
under this section but successfully conciliated only 300. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 29, 30-32 (1979) [hereinafter
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT]. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text infra.

RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL FAIR

cited as

15. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (1976). See notes 80-85 and accompanying text infra.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:641

attorney general" 1617in pursuing a remedy through the courts.' 7
Enforcement authority under Title VIII has been, and continues to be,
grossly inadequate to meet the objective of equal housing opportunity.
Thus, the important housing component to the 1960's Civil Rights legislation has proven to be "largely an empty promise."'" HUD's efforts to
enforce Title VIII have, for the most part, been unsuccessful since HUD
has virtually no enforcement powers under the Act.' 9 Likewise, enforcement efforts by the Department of Justice have been limited since the Attorney General may pursue only pattern or practice suits or suits of general
public importance and is precluded from suing on behalf of individuals.2"
Thus, the third alternative, suits by individuals, has become the primary
means of 'securing remedies for victims of discriminatory housing practices. Yet, private suits are an inadequate, expensive, and time-consuming
means of achieving the objectives of equal opportunity in housing. Indeed, by the time a suit is successful, the plaintiffs best remedy - the
housing originally sought - is usually no longer available."'
While the courts have construed provisions of Title VIII favorably toward victims of discrimination, private civil actions alone have not significantly furthered the objectives of the Act. Recently, Congress has
responded to the inherent enforcement weaknesses in Title VIII by proposing amendments to the Act.22 These amendments, now pending, would
16. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 403 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). The "private attorney general" concept relates to the awarding of attorney's fees to the private plaintiff whose suit has "advanced the policy inherent in public interest legislation on behalf of a
significant class of persons." Dasher v. Housing Auth., 64 F.R.D. 720, 723 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). Cf Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (attorney's fees may be awarded
under private attorney general theory only if provided by statute). Under Title VIII, reasonable attorney's fees may be granted to the prevailing plaintiff who is unable to afford such
fees. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). For a discussion of attorney's fees in housing discrimination cases, see Lichtman, The Cost of Housing Discrimination.-Assessment of Damages and
Attorney's Fees/or Violations ofthe Civil RightsAct of1866 andthe FairHousingAct of 1968,
10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 963 (1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976). See notes 86-131 and accompanying text infra.
18. State of the Union Address by President Carter, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
143 (Jan. 25, 1979).
19. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 14, at 27-33. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES:
STRONGER FEDERAL ENFORCEMENTS NEEDED TO UPHOLD FAIR HOUSING LAWS 23-27

(1978) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. See also notes 76-78 and accompanying text
infra.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976). See notes 80-85 and accompanying text infra.
21.

1979 Hearings,supra note 5, at 262 (statements of William L. Taylor and Glenda G.

Sloane).
22. H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7428 (1979); S.506, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1935 (1979). See notes 132-63 and accompanying text infra.
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grant HUD cease and desist authority as well as expand the scope of prohibited discriminatory activities. This Note traces the development of fair
housing in the United States through the actions of the federal government
and the courts and concludes that the realization of equal opportunity in
housing will be achieved only by improved enforcement of Title VIII specifically through the adoption of amendments to the Act granting HUD
administrative enforcement authority.
I.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

To

TITLE

VIII:

THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAIR HOUSING

A. Early FederalPrograms
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, all citizens of the United States are
guaranteed "the same right, in every state and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property."2 3 Until the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,24 however, this statute laid virtually dormant.2 5
For many years, discriminatory housing practices flourished and, until recently, were actively promoted by the policies of the federal and state governments.26 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court declared that
Congress intended the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "to prohibit all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or rental of property - discrimination by
private owners as well as discrimination by public authorities."2 7 While
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as enacted guaranteed black citizens a private
right against housing discrimination, the federal government never officially supported this right, preferring instead to maintain its "laissez-faire"
relationship to the housing market until the 1930's.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).

24. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Jones, the Supreme Court upheld a complainant's right to
sue under § 1982 for racial discrimination based on defendant's refusal to sell plaintiff a
home even though the same action could have been brought under the recently enacted Title
VIII. The Court pointed to the "vast differences" which allowed the statutes to stand as
independent rights. Id at 417. Unlike Title VIII, § 1982 does not prohibit discrimination

on the basis of religion or national origin, nor does it refer to discrimination in advertising,
financing, or in the provision of services in connection with the sale or rental of housing. Id
at 413. Thus, in contrast to § 1982 which is a privately enforced general statute, Title VIII is
a "detailed housing law, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority." Id at 417.
25. TWENTY YEARS, supra note 1, at 2.

26. See notes 34-42 and accompanying text infra. Various state and local ordinances
supported discriminatory zoning practices, some of which were in effect long after they were
declared unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See UNITED STATES
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 4 (1973).
27. 392 U.S. at 421-22. The Court stated: "when racial discrimination herds men into
ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a
relic of slavery." Id at 442-43.
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Prior to the 1930's, housing transactions occurred within a housing market that was almost totally unregulated by the federal government.2 8
When the government entered the housing market during the New Deal, it
created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),29 the Federal Home
31
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB),3 ° and the Homeowners' Loan Corporation,
which were designed to assist in housing finance. Later, in 1944, Congress
created the Veteran's Administration loan guarantee program3 2 which was
similar in function to the FHA mortgage insurance program.3 3 While
these programs enabled millions of people to purchase homes, they also
fostered greater racial housing segregation since they were carried out
34
under "aggressively discriminatory" policies.
The Federal Housing Administration revolutionized the housing and
home finance industries, making housing available to great numbers of
people through the introduction of the standard low down payment and
thirty-year amortized mortgage.3 5 These benefits were seldom available to
28. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 132.
29. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18 U.S.C.).
30. Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 47 Stat. 725 (codified in
scattered sections of 12, 18 U.S.C.). Of the four federal financial regulatory agencies - the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency - only the FHLBB acted
before 1968 to discourage discrimination in housing. In June 1961, the FHLBB adopted a
resolution against racial discrimination in mortgage lending. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at
140. Currently, these four agencies regulate lending institutions which are responsible for
nearly eighty percent of the nation's mortgages. See MORTGAGE BANKERS' ASS'N OF
AMERICA, ECONOMICS AND RESEARCH DEP'T, MORTGAGE BANKING 1976, TRENDS REPORT
No. 21 (October 1977). These agencies now are charged with civil rights responsibilities
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976), the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1976), and the Community Reinvestment Act
of 1977, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901 (Supp. 1979), as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-5 (1976) and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1976). In compliance with the statutory requirements, each of the four agencies has either proposed or issued rules, regulations, and/or guidelines concerning the fair
housing duties of the lending institutions they regulate. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, Supra note
14, at 76, 79-106. See also II UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT - 1974: To PROVIDE ...
FOR FAIR HOUSING 14663, 166-208 (1974) [hereinafter cited as To PROVIDE . . . FOR FAIR HOUSING].
31. Homeowners' Loan Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§
1461-1470 (1976)).
32. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 291 (current version at 38
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1824 (1976)).
33. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 132.
34. Id The FHA and VA programs, to a great degree, facilitated the suburban housing
boom that began in the 1930's. Id at 136-37.
35. Id at 133-34. Home ownership blossomed under the liberalized financing introduced by FHA. By 1970, over three out of five housing units were owner-occupied. Id at
135. However, only moderate and middle-income families primarily benefitted under FHA
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black homebuyers, however, since most FHA investments were in white
neighborhoods. 36 Furthermore, FHA had a policy against allowing "the
infiltration of. . .inharmonious racial groups" into neighborhoods because "a change in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in values." 37 FHA policy also encouraged its
mortgage insurees to file restrictive covenants to prohibit "the occupancy
of properties except by the race for which they are intended. 3 8
In 1948, the Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, declared that racially
restrictive covenants on property were not constitutionally enforceable.3 9
Two years after the Shelley decision, the FHA and VA reversed their policies and no longer insured mortgages which were recorded with restrictive
covenants.4 Thus, the discriminatory policies of these agencies were in
force throughout the first five years after World War II, during which time
over 900,000 units of FHA-insured housing were produced." Indeed, of
the total FHA-insured housing constructed during the post-war building
boom, it is estimated that less than two percent was made available to
minority purchasers.4 2
B. Origins of the FederalFairHousing Law
In 1962, with President Kennedy's Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing, the federal government took its first major stand in favor
of fair housing. Executive Order 11,063 represented President Kennedy's
attempt to eliminate housing discrimination with "a stroke of the pen."43
The Order, however, fell far short of that promise since it applied only to
and VA housing programs. See
POLICY -

TWENTY YEARS, supra note
THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 208-09 (1962).

1,at 40; P. WENDT,

HOUSING

36. Nearly all of the FHA- and VA-produced housing was located in the suburbs and
occupied by whites. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 134-35.
37. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, UNDERWRITING MANUAL §§ 935, 937
(1938).
38. Id § 980(3)(g). The Veteran's Administration also had a policy which encouraged
racial covenants. See TWENTY YEARS, supra note 1,at 40. In addition, the FHLBB and the
Homeowner's Loan Corporation also advocated racially segregated neighborhoods. M.
SLOANE, supra note 6, at 134-35.
39. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Shelley decision represented a departure from prior decisions. Earlier, in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926), the Court held that the fifth,
thirteenth, or fourteenth amendments did not prohibit private racially restrictive covenants
since they were private, rather than state, actions. In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the act of recording a racially restrictive covenant in itself constituted a Title VIII violation. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
40. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 135.
41. TWENTY YEARS, supra note 1, at 40.
42. Id at 41. See generally M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 139-42.
43. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 142.
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public housing, housing provided on urban renewal land, and housing
financed through FHA and VA programs.44 Indeed, the scope of Executive Order 11,063, at the time of its promulgation, was limited to only one
percent of the nation's housing. Furthermore, compliance with the order
was never realized since sanctions were "rarely imposed."4 5
The second major effort by the federal government to promote equal
opportunity in housing was the enactment of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin against persons who are eligible to participate in any program receiving federal assistance.4 6 In application, the scope of Title VI,
as it affects housing programs, has also been limited. 7 No housing provided with FHA or VA mortgage insurance is included, nor does Title VI
apply to housing provided by federally insured lending institutions.4a As a
result, only one-half of one percent of the nation's housing is covered by
Title VI's ban on discrimination. Moreover, under Title VI, beneficiaries
of federal housing assistance programs may be denied further support if
they discriminate. 9 Yet, government termination of funds, perhaps the
most effective sanction against discrimination, has rarely been imposed
under Title VI. ° Title VI has had an impact, however, in promoting integration in public housing, tenant selection, and site selection policies.5
44. See note 8 supra. Executive Order No. 11,063 applied only to housing provided
under federal aid agreements signed after Nov. 20, 1962, and therefore most postwar FHAand VA-financed housing was not included. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 143.
45. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 143. For example, litigation was never pursued with
regard to builders or owners of housing who were under agreement or contract before Nov.
20, 1962, even if a complaint charging racial discrimination was made against them.
TWENTY YEARS, supra note 1,at 67.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
47. See ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 14, at 37-40.
48. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 143.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
50. To PROVIDE . .. FOR FAIR HOUSING, supra note 30, at 52-70. As of 1974, HUD
had never terminated the funds of an ongoing project for noncompliance with Title VI.
HUD's reluctance to impose this sanction may be due to its preference for achieving compliance by voluntary agreement. Id at 65. Furthermore, the fear of a political backlash resulting from terminating the funding of a city that operates its programs in violation of Title VI
has been a major factor in HUD's reluctance to utilize this sanction. Interview with Sterling
Tucker, HUD Assistant Sec'y for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (Dec. 4, 1979).
51. See TWENTY YEARS, supra note 1,at 68-71. But see Note, Racial Discriminationin
Public Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63, 116 (1970) (the national goal of integrated public housing and balanced site selection can be achieved only through nondiscriminatory tenant selection, administrative changes, and court-imposed remedies). See also
Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Gatreaux v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
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C FairHousing Becomes National Policy Under Title VIII
After a period of long and intensive deliberation, Congress enacted Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act.52 The Act resulted in part from the strong
concern felt by members of Congress that segregated housing patterns
might have generated the racial unrest of the period.53 Moreover, many
members of Congress believed that no significant progress in the civil
rights area, particularly in education5 4 and employment,5 5 could be made
without enacting an open housing law.56
In comparison to the two earlier governmental attempts to prohibit discrimination in housing, Title VIII was the most comprehensive. Under
Title VIII, it is unlawful to discriminate against any person on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex,5 7 or national origin with regard to the negotiation, terms, or conditions of a sale or lease of a dwelling after receiving a
bona fide offer; the advertisement of such property by indicating a discriminatory preference; or the representation to any person for discriminatory
purposes that an otherwise available dwelling is not available.58 The Act
applies to all dwellings, but as a result of the two exempted categories,5 9
52. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 42. U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976)). For the
legislative background of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, see Dubofsky, supra
note 1.
53. 1967 Hearings,supra note I, at 98 (remarks of Roy Wilkins). The assassination of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., created the impetus to propel the Civil Rights bill through the
House of Representatives. See Dubofsky, supra note 1, at 160.
54. See Note, supra note 1, at 736. In addition, studies indicating that the quality of
education in defacto segregated inner-city schools was extremely poor supported the congressional belief that integration was necessary. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COMM'N ON

18-20, 114 (1967);
1967 Hearings,supra note 1, at 161 (remarks of Louis Pollak).
55. See Note, supra note 1, at 737. Several witnesses testified regarding the relationship
between the isolation of blacks in the central-cities and the increase in employment opportunities in the suburbs. See, e.g., 1967 Hearings,supra note 1, at 103, 218-20, 221.
56. During Senate debates on Title VIII, Senator Hart remarked: "We must break the
ghetto wall if success in any of these related areas [of civil rights] is to be possible." 113
CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

CONG. REC. 3395 (1967).

57. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976)), amended §§ 804, 805, 806, and 901 of
Title VIII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. This Note, however, deals with
Title VIII primarily as it relates to racial minorities.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(d) (1976). Section 3604(e) prohibits actual or attempted
"blockbusting" for profit. "Blockbusting" occurs when blacks move into a predominantly
white neighborhood. The term refers to the attempt by real estate brokers to exploit this
situation by making constant, uninvited solicitations of white families for listings to sell their
houses. For a description of this process, see United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004,
1005 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
59. The first exclusion exempts a single family dwelling which is sold or rented by its
owner if the owner has title or an interest in no more than three single-family homes at one
time, provided that the owner does not employ a real estate agent or engage in discrimina-
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only eighty percent of all of the nation's housing is included. 6° Furthermore, Title VIII specifically prohibits real estate brokers from engaging in
any discriminatory act 6 ' and prohibits discrimination in the availability,
terms, or conditions of financing of housing.62
Under one of the three alternative enforcement procedures of Title VIII,
any person who has been or believes he or she will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice may file, within 180 days, a written complaint
with HUD pursuant to section 810 of the statute.63 Within thirty days
after receipt of the complaint, HUD must conduct an investigation.' If
either state or local laws provide substantially equivalent rights and remedies to the aggrieved party, the Secretary must refer the complaint to the
state or local agency for conciliation.6 5 If the state does not commence
tory advertising. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1976). The second category of housing exempted
from the Act is the "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house" exemption for owner-occupied dwellings in which fewer than four other families reside independently of each other. Id §
3603(b)(2). Section 3607 allows religious groups or private clubs to rent or sell housing to
members of their religion or club for other than a commercial purpose provided that such
membership is not restricted on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Id § 3607.
60. M. SLOANE, supra note 6, at 144.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1976).
62. Id § 3605.
63. Id § 3610(a). Section 810 provides in part:
(a) Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur (hereinafter "person aggrieved") may file a complaint with the Secretary [of HUD] . . . . Within thirty days after receiving a
complaint, or within thirty days after the expiration of any period of reference
under subsection(c) ... , the Secretary shall investigate the complaint and give
notice in writing to the person aggrieved whether he intends to resolve it. If the
Secretary decides to resolve the complaint, he shall proceed to try to eliminate or
correct the alleged discriminatory housing practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion ...
Id
64. See note 63 supra.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1976). HUD has recognized the following jurisdictions as providing substantially equivalent rights and remedies: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. 24 C.F.R. § 115.11 (1979). "Substantial
equivalency" is based upon the following criteria: (1) the state or local law must provide for
an administrative enforcement body to receive and process complaints; (2) the administrative enforcement body must have authority to investigate allegations of complainants and
have the power to conciliate complaint matters; (3) the state or local law may not place any
excessive burdens on the complainant which might discourage the filing of complaints; (4)
the state or local law must be sufficiently comprehensive in its prohibitions so as to be an
effective instrument in carrying out the purposes and intent of Title VIII; and (5) the state or
local law must not contain exemptions that are substantially less than the coverage of Title
VIII. Id § 115.3.
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proceedings within thirty days or if, in the Secretary's judgment, it is not
acting with reasonable promptness, then the Secretary may reenter the
case.6 6 Under Title VIII, HUD's enforcement power is limited to the authority to seek an end to the discriminatory practice through "conference,
conciliation, and persuasion."6 7 HUD may not issue cease and desist orders. If the Secretary is unable to secure voluntary compliance with the
law within thirty days of either the filing of the complaint or of HUD's
reentry into the case, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate civil action.68
Under the second alternative, an injured individual may file suit directly
in federal court pursuant to section 812 of the Act, without first having
filed a complaint with HUD or with a state or local agency. 69 Relief is
limited to an injunction, actual damages, a maximum of $1,000 in punitive
damages, and court costs.7 0 In addition, reasonable attorney's fees may be
granted to a prevailing plaintiff who is not able to afford attorney fees.7 1
Finally, as the third alternative enforcement mechanism under Title
VIII, section 813 of the Act authorizes the Justice Department to initiate,
or on referral by HUD, to proceed with a civil action against any person
who has engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory housing activities7 2 and against anyone who is responsible for denying a group of per66. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1976). A recent study of state agencies with statutes providing
remedies similar to Title VIII revealed a pattern of delay in investigations and an inability to
provide timely relief to victims of discrimination. CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY REVIEW,
STATE AGENCIES AND THEIR ROLE IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as STATE AGENCIES].
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976). The Fair Housing Act places primary responsibility on
HUD for enforcing the prohibition on discrimination in housing. Id § 3608(a). Along with
its obligations of conference, conciliation, and persuasion in response to complaints of housing discrimination, HUD also has a duty under Title VIII to administer all of its programs in
a manner which "affirmatively" promotes the policy of equal housing opportunity. Id §
3608(d)(5). HUD's affirmative actions, however - focusing primarily on FHA single-family mortgage insurance programs - have lagged behind the duties imposed on it by Title
VIII. See Rubinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream." Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 491
(1979). See also notes 23-42 and accompanying text supra.
68. Id § 3610(d).
69. Id § 3612(a). Section 812 provides in part: "(a) The rights granted by §§ 3603,
3604, 3605, and 3606 may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district
courts without regard to the amount in controversy and in appropriate State and local courts
of general jurisdiction." Id
70. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
71. Id Recently, in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that legal fees may be granted to prevailing defendants in Title VII
cases only when the "plaintifi's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation
. Id at 421.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976). Courts have interpreted "pattern or practice" liberally to
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sons their rights under Title VIII when such denial raises an issue of
general public importance." The Attorney General is not now authorized
to remedy individual complaints of discrimination and is not specifically
4
authorized to intervene in private Title VIII litigation.1
II.

WHY DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING PERSISTS: THE TITLE

VIII

ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM

A. Title VIII" Statutory Enforcement Mechanisms Strained
Although practically all forms of housing discrimination have been prohibited by law for eleven years, numerous and widespread instances of
racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing have been recently
documented. Under the sponsorship of HUD, a nationwide study of housing practices has been completed which found that a black person who
visits four real estate agents in an attempt to buy a home has a sixty-two
percent chance of being discriminated against and that in a search for
rental housing, the likelihood of discrimination reaches seventy-five percent.75 The principal explanation for the persistence of discrimination in
the housing market lies within the enforcement provisions of Title VIII.
Two of the three avenues of enforcement under the Act - investigation
and conciliation by HUD, and Department of Justice litigation - have
proven to be grossly inadequate to redress individual victims of discrimination and to eliminate broader institutional patterns of discrimination.
The third method, private suits, has been extremely successful in obtaining
liberal judicial construction of Title VIII provisions. However, reliance on
individual suits to enforce compliance with Title VIII results in relief being
available only to those complainants with the time and financial resources
to pursue a private action.
allow, for example, suits based on a single course of dealings between a realtor and black
homebuyers. See, e.g., United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1974). Since neither the text nor legislative history of Title VIII defines "pattern or practice," courts have referred to the legislative history of Title VII, which
says that a "pattern or practice would be present only when the denial of rights consists of
something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature." United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 482 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (quoting 110
CONG. REC. 14,270 (June 18, 1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). See Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the FairHousing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 199, 222-23 (1978).

73. Section 813 has been held to require that a specific violation must have had a
measurable public impact before the Attorney General is authorized to enforce private civil
rights. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217 (4th Cir. 1972).
74. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 14, at 230.
75. NCDH SURVEY, supra note 4. The survey used pairs of "testers," black and white,
who posed as seeking either housing to rent or buy. These testers answered newspaper advertisements in over 40 metropolitan areas. During the study, contact was made with over
3,000 rental agents. For a definition of "testing," see note 95 infra.
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Through conference, conciliation, and persuasion, HUD has been able
to resolve complaints of discriminatory practices in only approximately
fifty percent of the cases in which it has found evidence of discrimination.
In resolving a Title VIII complaint, HUD's objectives are to obtain either
substitute housing or monetary damages for the complainant. In a recent
report to Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed 332
Title VIII complaints received in three HUD regions.76 Of these complaints, HUD's investigation uncovered clear evidence of discrimination in
fifty-seven cases, but it successfully conciliated thirty-six." Furthermore,
the GAO study found that delays in investigation by HUD or delays
caused by untimely or unsatisfactory resolution of complaints referred to
state and local governments have severely hindered the chances for successful conciliation of discriminatory practices.78
Especially significant in HUD conciliation efforts is the fact that any
agreement reached between the aggrieved party and the Title VIII violator
is purely voluntary. Title VIII grants HUD no authority to compel conciliation. Furthermore, unless the complainant is represented by counsel at
the conciliation, a respondent is likely to abandon conciliation efforts
before an agreement is reached, or refuse to cooperate altogether.79
Similarly, the Department of Justice also has had limited success in enforcing the provisions of the Fair Housing Act. Pursuant to section 813,
the Department of Justice may bring suit only when the Attorney General
believes there is a "pattern or practice" of discrimination or when a "group
of persons" has been denied equal housing opportunity and such denial
raises an issue of general public importance."0 Finally, limited resources
prevent the Department of Justice from bringing the number of suits necessary to reach violators of Title VIII in any significant way. 81 As of August, 1978, the Justice Department had initiated a total of 300 pattern or
practice suits or suits raising issues of public importance. Of these 300
76. GAO REPORT, supra note 19.

77. Id at 21. Of 36 resolved complaints, HUD obtained housing in one case, monetary
damages in 17, and housing and monetary damages in 3. Of the remainder of the 332 complaints, HUD was unable to resolve 247 for lack of clear evidence and 21 cases in which it
had clear evidence; HUD had concurred in actions taken by state or local agencies in 18
complaints and either had taken no action on or had lost the files for the remaining 10. Id
78. Id at 23-25. See STATE AGENCIES, supra note 66.
79. Former Secretary of HUD, Patricia R. Harris, testified that: "where the victim of
discrimination meets with the HUD conciliator and with the respondent, and it is evident
that the complainant is unrepresented by counsel, conciliation often collapses. There is no
credible threat of 'consequences' should the respondent refuse to cooperate." 1978 Hearings,
supra note 3, at 30.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1976).
81. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 14, at 232.
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suits, most were settled by consent decrees.8 2 Indeed, several courts have
defined the role of the Justice Department under Title VIII to be the pursuit of preventive relief 83 and therefore have refused to award individual
damages.8 4 Thus, insufficient resources for Justice Department litigation,
coupled with HUD's inadequate enforcement authority, have limited the
progress toward equal housing opportunity.
B. JudicialAdvancement of Fair Housing Goals
The Supreme Court has recognized that due to the limitations on enforcement authority of HUD and the Department of Justice under Title
VIII, "the main generating force must be private suits in which

. . .

the

complainants act not only in their own behalf but also 'as private attorneys
general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority. ' ' 86 Of the three methods for enforcement of Title VIII, the
private suit has proven to be the most successful in that the courts have
broadly construed various provisions of the Act 87 in order to facilitate the
achievement of its goals.8 8 In two major areas, standing to sue and burden
82. Id at 231.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151, 1153 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 871 (1976); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 219 n.19 (4th Cir. 1972).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 537 F.2d at 1155; United States v. Mitchell, 580
F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1978).
85. The Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Drew Days, has noted the 'enormity' of the task of implementing fair housing in the light of the limited authority and resources of the Department of Justice and the lack of enforcement power on the part of
HUD." 1978 Hearings,supra note 3, at 37 (statement of Drew S. Days). The government
has not appropriated sufficient funds to adequately support fair housing enforcement. In
fiscal year 1974, the total Title VIII appropriation for both HUD and the Department of
Justice was $6.2 million. In 1979, the projected figure was only $11.2 million for fair housing
enforcement by both agencies. The total budget for all fair housing programs reached only
$17.4 million. The total budget for enforcement of equal employment laws, on the other
hand, is over $300 million. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 14, at 232.
86. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). For a discussion
of the "private attorney general" concept, see note 16 supra.
87. While the Court in Trafficante decided that the fair housing law which Congress
had given "highest priority" should be given a "generous construction" by the courts, 409
U.S. at 212, the general trend is for courts to construe standing provisions narrowly. The
"prudential standing rules" were discussed in Warth v. Seldin, 422 .U.S. 490 (1975):
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular factual issues. This inquiry
involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. In both dimensions the standing question is founded
in concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a
democratic society.
Id at 498. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1974).
88. In Trafficante, the Court stated that the objectives of Title VIII are twofold: to end
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of proof, judicial interpretations of Title VIII have assisted private plaintiffs in bringing and in proving charges of housing discrimination.
By far, the greatest strides in Title VIII enforcement have been through
court decisions expanding the class of potential plaintiffs who are entitled
to sue and obtain relief for discriminatory housing practices. In Trafficante
v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co. ,89 two tenants of an apartment complex
were held to have standing pursuant to section 810 of the Act to file a
complaint with HUD against their landlord. The complaint alleged that
the landlord's discriminatory rental policies had stigmatized the tenants as
residents of a "white ghetto" and that they had suffered indirect injury by
being deprived of the social, business, and professional benefits that accrue
from living in an integrated community. The Court determined that Congress had intended standing for "persons aggrieved" under section 810 of
Title VIII to extend "as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution."9 ° Significantly, the Supreme Court recognized that in order to advance the twin goals of Title VIII, the prohibition of housing
discrimination and the promotion of integrated living patterns, 9' standing
under section 810 must be broad enough to include those plaintiffs who are
injured by a discriminatory housing practice even though they are not its
direct objects. 92 After Trafficante, however, the limits on standing to sue
directly in federal court, under section 812, remained unclear.
With its decision in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Court
apparently has resolved the issue of standing to sue under Title VIII. 93
The Bellwood case involved an allegation that a real estate firm had engaged in the illegal activity of racial steering by encouraging black
homeseekers to look at houses in certain areas of Bellwood while discouraging whites from buying in the same area. The Court held that the village of Bellwood had standing to sue based on the allegation that the
steering had caused the village to suffer economic injury. 9a In addition,
the individual plaintiffs who had posed as potential homebuyers 95 were
discrimination in housing; and to "replace the ghettos with integrated residential patterns."
409 U.S. at 211 (citing remarks of Sen. Mondale, 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1967)).
89. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
90. Id at 209.
91. Id at 211 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale)). Accord,
Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (en banc) (Wilkey, J.,
concurring) (Title VIII was intended to extend beyond discrimination in"actual sales and
rentals" and was "seen as an attempt to alter the entire character of the housing market").
92. 409 U.S. at 219-21.
93. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
94. Id at I10-11.
95. The individual plaintiffs who posed as potential homebuyers were "testers." "Testing" is a technique used to determine whether discriminatory practices are being used by
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entitled to sue on the theory that the racial steering denied them, as residents of the target area, "the social and professional benefits of living in an
integrated society." 9 6 According to Bellwood, complainants under Title
VIII may either file a complaint with HUD under section 810 or file suit
directly in federal court under section 812. 9" Furthermore, according to the
Court, standing under either section is to extend without limitation to complainants who assert either a direct or an indirect injury,9 8 provided that
the injury is "distinct and palpable" in accordance with the minimum standards9 9 under Article III of the Constitution. Bellwood thus expanded
Trafficante in holding that "[sitanding under § 812, like that under § 810,
is 'as broad as is permitted by Article III. . . ."' Indeed, in the opinion
of the Court, the absence of the language "persons aggrieved" in section
812 does not signify that standing under section 812 should be more limited than under section 810. Rather, the Court found that section 812 on
its face could not be read as restricting potential plaintiffs.'' Thus, after
Bellwood, any person who is directly or indirectly injured by a discriminain federal court, or, in the
tory housing practice has standing to bring 0suit
2
alternative, to file a complaint with HUD.1
Another area of judicial advancement in fair housing enforcement has
been burden of proof. A substantial number of federal courts have held
that in order to establish aprimafacie °3 case of a violation of Title VIII, a
complainant must show only that the action complained of has had a discriminatory effect." Although complainants who bring a charge of houscomparing the experiences of blacks and whites in seeking to rent or buy the same apartments or houses.
96. 441 U.S. at Ill.
97. For the text of § 810, see note 63 supra. The text of § 812 is provided at note 69
supra.
98. 441 U.S. at 102-03.
99. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
100. 441 U.S. at 109.
101. Id at 103.
102. With its decision in Bellwood, the Court overruled the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Topic v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976)
(Congress intended to limit direct access to the federal courts under § 812 to "direct objects"
of Title VIII violations).
103. Primafacieis a Latin term meaning "on its face." In civil rights litigation, the term
is used to denote the use of statistical or other evidence of objective fact which, if established, warrants an inference that discrimination exists. See Note, Applying the Title VII
PrimaFacie Case to Title VIII Litigation, II HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 128, 128 n.4 (1976).
See also Schwemm, supra note 72, at 243-50 (1978) (statistical proof of discriminatory effect
in Fair Housing cases).
104. While the Civil Rights Act was pending, the Senate specifically rejected an amendment which would have required proof of discriminatory intent as a prerequisite to establishing a Title VIII violation. 114 CONG. REC. 5214, 5221-22 (1968). Moreover, the inquiry
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ing discrimination under the fourteenth amendment must prove that the
purpose or intent of the challenged practice is discriminatory, 0 5 under TiOnce a
tle VIII, "[e]ffect, and not motivation, is the touchstone .
Title VIII plaintiff has demonstrated that a housing practice has had a
discriminatory effect, the burden then shifts to the defendant to justify the
housing practice.
In UnitedStates v. City of Black Jack, a municipality which had enacted
an ordinance prohibiting construction of any multiple-family dwellings
was found to have violated Title VIII because the effect of the ordinance
would be to preclude almost eighty-five percent of the black population in
the metropolitan area from obtaining housing in the ninety-nine percent
white town of Black Jack.' 07 Upon a finding of discriminatory effect, the
court applied a standard normally used in equal protection cases' °8 and
shifted the burden to the city of Black Jack to justify its ordinance by proving a "compelling" interest. The city's claims of road and traffic control,
limitations on the growth of the school system, and maintenance of property values, however, were "substantial[ly]" balanced against the limitations placed on housing opportunity in Black Jack.'0 9
In a similar case, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., "O the ninety-nine percent white village of Arlington Heights denied a rezoning petition which would have allowed the Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation to build a federally subsidized low-tomoderate-income housing development. The effect of the village's refusal
*."..,

under Title VIII has often been analogized to the Title VII "effects" test established by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1970). See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1976). According to Griggs, after a plaintiff makes a showing of discriminatory effect, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the employment practice as a "business
necessity." 401 U.S. at 431. See also note 122 infra.
105. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
106. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
107. Id at 1186.
108. Under the constitutional concept of primafacie racial discrimination developed in
Supreme Court equal protection opinions, a plaintiff has to prove that defendant's conduct
was motivated by discriminatory intent. Once a primafaciecase is established, the burden
shifts to defendant to demonstrate that its conduct promotes a compelling governmental
interest. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (housing discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employment
discrimination). In several cases brought after passage of Title VIII, courts frequently would
ignore Title VIII claims and base their decisions on the equal protection clause. See, e.g.,
United Farm Workers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th
Cir. 1974); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
109. 508 F.2d at 1187.
110. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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to permit construction of the subsidized housing was to preclude a large
number of blacks from living in Arlington Heights since forty percent of
those eligible to live in the development were black. Furthermore, it was
likely that Arlington Heights, whose white population had increased significantly due to a building boom, would have remained almost totally
segregated without construction of the subsidized housing. The Supreme
Court reversed the case on the grounds that the equal protection claim had
not been supported by proof of purposeful discriminatory action and remanded it for consideration of the claims under the Fair Housing Act."'
On remand, the Seventh Circuit applied the effects test but "refuse[d] to
conclude that every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal
[under Title VIII]. 11 2 Rather, the court developed four critical factors
which should be applied in determining whether evidence of discriminatory effect is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VIII: (1) the strength
of the evidence of discriminatory effect; (2) whether some evidence of discriminatory intent exists, although not enough to satisfy the constitutional
standard of Washington v. Davis;" 3 (3) the defendant's interest in the practice that has a discriminatory effect; and (4) the liklihood that the relief
requested will restrain defendant from interfering with other property
owners who wish to provide housing for minorities rather than compel
defendant affirmatively to provide such housing."l 4 The court noted that
although the village was acting under a legitimate grant of zoning authority and its refusal to rezone was not the result of intentional racial discrimination, the plaintiffs, by contrast, were seeking to promote the national
goal of integrated housing by building in Arlington Heights. 1 5 In remanding the case, the court of appeals directed the district court to find a
violation of Title VIII by discriminatory effect if it could find no other land
within Arlington Heights that was properly zoned and suitable for subsidized housing." 6
In Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 1 17 the Court of Appeals for the
111. Id at 271.
112. 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).

113. See note 108 supra.
114. 558 F.2d at 1290.
115. Id at 1293-94.
116. Id at 1295. The Seventh Circuit interpreted the relevant language of § 804(a),

which provides that "it shall be unlawful ... [t]o make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin," as not requiring proof of
discriminatory intent. Id at 1290. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976). The court noted that the

same "because of race" language in § 703(h) of Title VII was held not to require a standard
of proof beyond discriminatory effect to establish a primafacie case of employment discrimination. 558 F.2d at 1289 n.6 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971)).
117. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
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Third Circuit concluded that "discriminatory effect alone will, if proved,
establish a Title VIflprimafacie case .. . 8 In Rizzo, plaintiffs sought
to compel construction of a planned low-income housing development in a
predominantly white section of South Philadelphia. The court of appeals
held that the urban renewal activities of both the Philadelphia Housing
Authority and the Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia had resulted
in denying housing to families because of their race."1 9 According to the
court, defendants' failure to construct the housing had the effect of discriminating against a disproportionate percentage of black families who
were qualified to live there. Furthermore, the court noted that the neighborhood, which had been integrated before the land clearance activity,
would remain all-white unless the project was built.12 °
Under the standard enunciated by the court in Rizzo, once a discriminatory effect has been established, a defendant can rebut plaintiff'sprimafacie case by showing that defendant's actions served a legitimate interest
that could not be accomplished by less discriminatory means.' 2' In the
absence of any asserted justification by either PHA or RDA, the court
found it unnecessary to consider what factors, if any, would have over22
come plaintiffsprimafacie case.'
While the courts have varied as to the degree of evidence necessary to
rebut a Title VIII primafacie case, it is clear that a plaintiffs burden of
proof requires only a showing that the defendant's actions have had a discriminatory effect. By adopting the effects test as the standard of proof in
Title VIII cases, the courts have greatly reduced the burden of proving
housing discrimination and enhanced the enforcement potential of Title
VIII.
Finally, the lower federal courts have also advanced the enforcement
potential of Title VIII by broadly construing its specific provisions. Section 804(a) of the Act states that it is against the law to "otherwise make
unavailable or deny" a dwelling to any person because of race, color, reli118. Id at 148.
119. Id at 149-50.
120. Id at 149.
121. Id
122. Id at 149-50. The Third Circuit in Rizzo disagreed with the approach taken by the
Eighth Circuit in Black Jack that a "compelling interest" may rebut a Title VIII prima facie
case. Id at 148. According to Rizzo, the compelling interest standard should be used to
rebut charges of purposeful discrimination in equal protection cases. The court likewise
found that the "business necessity" test used in Title VII employment discrimination cases
could not readily be adapted to Title VIII purposes. Id Thus, the Rizzo court concluded
that "[flor the present, Title VIII criteria must emerge ... on a case-by-case basis." Id at
149
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gion, sex, or national origin.123 This provision has been interpreted by the
lower courts to prohibit, for example, racial steering by real estate brokers,124 discrimination by municipalities through zoning and land use authority, 125 mortgage redlining, 126 the assignment of lower valuations to
homes in racially integrated neighborhoods, 127 and recently, redlining in
homeowner's insurance.

128

123. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976).
124. Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich. 1973). For a definition of "steering'
see note 5 supra.
125. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). The Supreme
Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), rejected the argument that economic distinctions in land use are per se racial distinctions in violation of the equal protection clause.
In that case, the Court upheld a California requirement calling for a community referendum
on any proposal to build low income housing even though no other land use policies were
subject to the requirement.
126. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). Redlining is the practice employed by insurance companies and banks to refuse to loan money,
invest, or insure in designated geographic areas. See Werner, Frej & Madway, Redlining and
Disinvestment.- Causes, Consequences, and ProposedRemedies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
501 (Supp. 1976).
127. United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers (AIREA), 442 F. Supp.
1072 (N.D. I11.1977). In AIREA, the district court approved and ordered the entry of an
agreement between AIREA and the Justice Department, settling a suit which charged that
the appraisers' standard appraisal technique, treating race and national origin as factors
which lower the overall valuation of a property, violated the Fair Housing Act. The settlement agreement provided in pertinent part:
(1) It is improper to base a conclusion or opinion of value upon the premise that
the racial, ethnic, or religious homogeneity of the inhabitants of an area or a property is necessary for maximum value. (2) Racial, religious or ethnic factors are
deemed unreliable predictors of value trends or price variance. (3) It is improper
to base a conclusion or opinion of value, or a conclusion with respect to neighborhood trends, upon stereotyped or biased presumptions relating to race, color, religion, sex or national origin or upon unsupported presumptions relating to the
effective age or remaining life of the property being appraised or the life expectancy of the neighborhood in which it is located.
Id at 1077. Congress has proposed to prohibit the use of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
or national origin as factors in real estate appraisals. H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 805
(1979). This has met with opposition from the Society of Real Estate Appraisers who contend that such a prohibition would infringe on an appraiser's first amendment rights. 1979
Hearings,supra note 5, at 308 (statement of Charles L. Osenbaugh). Furthermore, according to the Society of Real Estate Appraisers:
[S]ound appraisal practice requires that all relevant factors, including race, religion and ethnic factors, which exist in the marketplace and which impact upon
market value, must be considered in a dispassionate, unbiased, nonprejudicial and
objective manner by the appraiser in reaching an opinion of value. The exclusion
of any relevantfactorfrom consideration may result in an incomplete appraisal and a
fictitious or directed "market value."
Id (emphasis in original).
128. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
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Although the courts have generously construed the major provisions of
Title VIII and thereby significantly expanded the enforcement potential of
the Act, private litigation is, nevertheless, a very limited enforcement
mechanism. Indeed, given the great length of time and expense necessary
for litigation, very few complainants are able to enjoy this right. Another
inhibiting factor in private Title VIII enforcement has been section 812(c),
the provision awarding attorney's fees only to the plaintiff who is both
successful and also unable to afford attorney's fees.' 29 Thus, the statute
discourages nonindigent victims of discrimination from bringing suit.
Furthermore, the Act provides that a court may award private litigants
"any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or
other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more
than $1,000 punitive damages." 3 ° This low ceiling on punitive damages,
coupled with the limitations on attorney's fee awards, provides little incentive for an individual to act as a private attorney general and assist in the
enforcement of the Fair Housing Act.13'
III.

A

TURNING POINT FOR FAIR HOUSING:

THE PROPOSED TITLE

VIII AMENDMENTS
It is apparent that Title VIII, as presently constituted, is not equipped to
eliminate the discriminatory practices preventing achievement of the goal
of equal housing opportunity. Indeed, Title VIII suffers from severe enforcement weaknesses that can be remedied only by amendment. Recently, Congress has focused upon the demonstrated inadequacies of the
existing law by proposing amendments to Title VIII 32 which, among other
changes, provide more comprehensive and flexible enforcement provisions.
Congressional discussions regarding the amendment of Title VIII enforcement provisions have centered on three alternatives. Foremost
among the alternatives is the proposed enforcement procedure, contained
in the pending Senate bill S. 506, that provides for the establishment
within HUD of a full-scale administrative process for dealing with Title
VIII complaints. Under S. 506, after investigation of the charges, the Secretary of HUD would file an administrative complaint upon a finding of
probable cause of a Title VIII violation. 33 During the proceedings, the
129. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).

130. Id
131.

See 1978 Hearings,supra note 3, at 307 (statement of William L. Taylor).

132. S. 506, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1935 (1979); H.R. 5200, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7428 (1979).
133. S. 506, § 811(a), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1939 (1979).
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Secretary could order temporary or preliminary relief pending final resolution of the complaint. 34 At the conclusion of the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) would make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and could order relief, including an order for respondent to cease and desist from engaging in discriminatory housing practices, as well as the imposition of up to $10,000 in civil penalties. The order of an ALJ, however,
could be reviewed and modified by the Secretary, and any final order of
the agency could be appealed to a court of appeals within sixty days following the Secretary's entry of the order.' 3 5
Another possible procedure for Title VIII enforcement, contained in the
pending House bill H.R. 5200, entails establishing an administrative process within HUD. 136 Under this scheme, the Secretary would investigate
charges of housing discrimination and attempt to resolve them informally
through conference, conciliation, and persuasion. If efforts at conciliation
fail, the Secretary would be authorized to file an administrative complaint
and a hearing on record would follow.' 3 7 Review or modification of the
order by the Secretary, however, would not be allowed under this procedure. Instead, an appeal to a federal district court would be available
within ten days of the order to any party objecting to specific findings of
fact or conclusions of law in the order. On appeal, a judge would make a
determination of the adequacy of the record and could, if necessary, receive additional evidence. The proposal, however, is silent regarding the
standard for review. The standard for review could be the traditional
"substantial evidence" test, providing that the judge should uphold an
AL's findings and conclusions if they are supported by substantial evidence from the record. 3 ' On the other hand, this proposal may envision
allowing the district court to subject the AL's determination to a more
stringent review and accord it less deference than under the substantial
evidence test.
A third alternative enforcement procedure is being considered for
amending Title VIII.' 39 This proposal would narrowly limit the enforce134. Id § 810(4)(b).

135. Id § 811(c).
136. The pending House bill, H.R. 5200, is similar to S. 506 in its enforcement provisions
except that H.R. 5200 does not allow the Secretary to modify any findings of fact or conclusions of law by the ALJ. See H.R. 5200, § 810(4)(b), 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125

CONG.

REC.

7249 (1979). H.R. 5200 also limits the Secretary to referring matters requiring temporary or
preliminary relief to the Attorney General who may bring appropriate action. Id § 811 (a).
137. Section 811(a) as proposed.
138. Section 811(c) as proposed.
139. Although neither has formally introduced this amendment, Representative Sensenbrenner in the House, and Senator Thurmond in the Senate have considered proposing this
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ment authority of HUD to its present investigation and conciliation duties,
leaving the primary means for enforcement with the Justice Department.
Significantly, however, this proposal would give the Attorney General the
authority to bring suits on behalf of individuals as well as pattern
or prac140
tice and general public interest suits under the present statute.
Of the various proposals for Title VIII enforcement, the third alternative, which would authorize the Attorney General to sue on behalf of individuals rather than establish an administrative enforcement mechanism
within HUD, is the least promising. The principal objection to this procedure is that federal litigation is a long and tedious process. In one federal
district court of California, for example, there is presently a fifteen-month
backlog of cases. 4 ' Due to the nature of housing discrimination suits, it is
often imperative that they be resolved expeditiously if any meaningful individual relief, such as obtaining the housing that has been wrongfully denied, is to be available. If Title VIII enforcement were to rest solely with
the courts, the chances of obtaining this individual remedy would be
greatly diminished. Furthermore, it is doubtful that more ordinary, factually simple housing discrimination cases would be pursued if resolution
were months away.
Another problem with the proposal to give the Department of Justice
the primary role in fair housing enforcement is the lack of Department
staff necessary to expand fair housing activities. Under Title VIII as presently constituted, the Department of Justice is the only agency with viable
enforcement authority. Yet the Housing Section of the Department's Civil
Rights Division consists of less than two dozen lawyers. 4 2 During the ten
years in which Title VIII has been in effect, the Housing Section has participated in an average of only thirty-two pattern and practice suits each
year. 43 Given its limited staff and resources, the Department of Justice' 44
does not have the capacity to redress individual grievances.' 4 5
as an alternative amendment. Interview with Philip Kiko, Legislative Assistant to Rep. F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Nov. 9, 1979).
140. A variation on this procedure would be to amend Title VIII to allow HUD to investigate and conciliate, with the authority to bring a court action, if necessary, to enforce the
conciliation agreement. This type of procedure is similar to that granted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in resolving Title VII claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
141. See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 1978 101 (1978).
142. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 14, at 60.
143. Id at 71.
144.

For a discussion of the organization and budget of the Housing Section of the Civil

Rights Division of the Department of Justice, see ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra note 14, at
60-73.
145. Recently, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti stated that he intends to pursue
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The more desirable method for enforcing Title VIII is through an administrative enforcement mechanism within HUD. A crucial factor in the
failure of HUD's conciliation efforts has been the lack of authority delegated to HUD to enforce the law. 146 With cease and desist authority
vested in HUD, the viable threat of consequences could act as a substantial
deterrent to potential Title VIII violators. Furthermore, in contrast to the
judicial process, the administrative procedure will provide a forum for
more rapid resolution of complaints. Presumably, an administrative
mechanism established specifically to hear Title VIII cases could be more
expeditious in resolving complaints than the burdened federal courts. In
time, Title VIII ALJs would develop an expertise concerning the various
discriminatory housing practices. Moreover, there is evidence 47that the administrative approach encourages early settlement of claims. 1
Both proposed administrative enforcement schemes would provide either that the Secretary may order temporary or preliminary relief pending
final resolution of a complaint or that the Secretary may refer the matter to
the Attorney General to bring an action for such relief. Thus, HUD could
assure that the housing unit which is the subject of the complaint would be
available if the complainant were successful, 148 a remedy that is presently
not available under Title VIII. Furthermore, other remedies, including
monetary relief, might be available under this administrative system. Arguably, it would be within the authority of the administrative tribunal to
award plaintiff such "make-whole" monetary relief as out-of-pocket expenses incurred while wrongfully being denied housing. 149 If a plaintiff
has suffered other calculable damages such as mental anguish, however,
housing discrimination cases aggressively whether or not Title VIII is amended. Q. andA.
with the Attorney General, 65 A.B.A.J. 1497, 1498 (1979).

146. 1978 Hearings,supra note 3, at 4-5 (statement of Patricia R. Harris).
147. For example, in 1970, the NLRB, which has cease and desist authority, received
33,581 cases. Of those cases, 92.5% were disposed of with only the need for a formal hearing; of the 2,217 cases heard by a hearing examiner, only 420 had to be filed for review or
enforcement in the court of appeals. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92ND CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 836 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited
as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972].

148. The draft bill H.R. 5200 provides that if a house is under contract of sale, encumbrance, or rental before a temporary order is issued, then the order shall not affect a bona
fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant without knowledge of the Title VIII charge. H.R.
5200, § 811(a), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7250 (1979).
149. For an analysis of the constitutionality of agency-awarded monetary relief, see NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HUD
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VIII THROUGH PROVISION OF MONETARY RELIEF TO COMPLAINANTS, reprintedin 1979 Hearings,supra note 5, at 38.
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the plaintiffs case could either be referred to the Attorney General or
brought as a private suit.
Under the pending bills, private enforcement also would be substantially strengthened by various provisions which would increase the time
during which suit can be brought from six months to up to three years; lift
the $1,000 ceiling on punitive damages available to private litigants; make
attorney's fees available to any prevailing party in either an administrative
or judicial proceeding, regardless of financial status; and allow the Attorney General to intervene in private actions if the case is certified to be of
general public importance. 50
A review of federal law illustrates the strong precedent for granting federal agencies administrative enforcement and cease and desist powers. Indeed, over eighteen federal departments and agencies possess cease and
desist authority 5 ' over a variety of categories ranging from animal welfare
52
and plant variety protection to labor relations, trade, and commerce.'
Most of the agencies that have been granted cease and desist powers are
essentially regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, given federal precedent for
delegating cease and desist powers, it would hardly be improper to grant
similar authority to
HUD to enforce a policy as important as equal hous15 3
ing opportunity.
One standard argument in favor of the judicial process over an administrative procedure giving an agency responsibility for investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating claims, is that the latter violates due process rights
by, vesting all functions within an agency. However, the proposal to give
HUD administrative authority would merely incorporate the traditional
150. S. 506, § 812, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1939 (1979).
151. Citations to the federal statutes granting agencies cease and desist powers are compiled in 1979 Hearings, supra note 5, at 212-13.
152. In his testimony arguing for granting cease and desist authority to the EEOC, Senator Mondale stated:
The remarkable thing is that, under the present system at the federal level, if we
have a commercial dispute surrounding, say, securities, then we get the full range
of administrative remedies. If we have a labor dispute - a labor-management
dispute on either side - cease-and-desist powers are to be found. . . . We are
dealing with basic, fundamental human rights: the right to a job, the right to challenge the denial of employment on the grounds of color. And the only right we
have now is that if we do not use the traditional court system, we must be content
to come before a Commission which does not have the power to do much more
than conciliate.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, supra
note 147, at 800.
153. But see Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1 (recent congressional curtailment

of FTC regulatory authority seen as a "high-water mark for an anti-regulatory wave sweeping Congress this year").
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standards employed by other federal agencies with cease and desist powers. 5 4 Recently, in Withrow v. Larkin, 1 5 the Supreme Court upheld an
administrative procedure against a due process challenge in which both
investigative and adjudicative functions were vested in the same agency.
Indeed, according to the Court, even when administrative functions are
merged within one agency, there is15 6a presumption of honesty and fairness
on the part of the decisionmaker.
The basic difference between the two administrative schemes proposed
for Title VIII enforcement lies in their judicial review provisions. Under
the proposed Senate bill, S. 506, the HUD Secretary could modify, reject,
or remand any order of the ALJ. 57 After an order is final, a losing party
could appeal to a federal court of appeals. These are traditional administrative procedures as described in the Administrative Procedure Act.' 5 8
The appellate court would be able to overrule any findings or conclusions
that are arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence in
the case.' 5 9 On the other hand, if the H.R. 5200 is enacted, findirigs, conclusions, or orders of an ALJ could not be reviewed or altered by the Secretary. Instead, review could be had on direct appeal to a federal district
court, where the judge would make a determination. Questions arise as to
the standard and scope of review under this provision. Will the district
court be required to accept the administrative order if it is supported by
substantial evidence? May the judge be allowed to subject the administrative findings and conclusions to a greater degree of scrutiny and even go
beyond the record and accept additional evidence? These questions will,
no doubt, ultimately be resolved by Congress, but they reflect the concern
about possibly unworkable variations on traditional administrative procedure.' 60
154. See FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C.
Cir. 1968). Congressional authority to delegate adjudicative responsibilities to federal agencies was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1937).
155. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See also Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th
Cir. 1978). HUD administrative procedure would be governed by § 554(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, relating to separation of functions. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976).
156. 421 U.S. at 54-55.
157. Under Title VIII, the Secretary is required to refer complaints to those states or
localities that provide rights and remedies substantially equivalent to those in Title VIII. S.
506 and H.R. 5200 provide a similar requirement except that referral to the state agency
must be with the consent of the aggrieved party. In addition, "substantial equivalency"
would now take into consideration the current practices and past performance, if any, of the
agency. See, e.g., H.R. 5200, § 810(a)(3), 96th Cong., ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 7249 (1979).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1976).
159. Id § 706(a)(A), (E).
160. "You can't set judicial review like you can a thermostat." Telephone interview with
Richard Berg, Executive Sec'y, Administrative Conf. of the United States (Nov. 9, 1979).
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Certain questions about policymaking also arise in considering the differences between the two administrative schemes. For example, should an
ALJ with no agency review make the determination that a landlord who
rejects only those black apartment-seekers with poor credit records has violated Title VIII if statistical evidence shows that poor credit ratings are
more common among blacks than whites?' 6 ' HUD could decide, as a
matter of policy, that facially neutral housing practices which have a disproportionate impact on blacks violate Title VIII. 162 Yet, under the proposal in which the Secretary is not authorized to review ALJ
determinations, if an ALJ decides that disproportionate impact alone does
not violate Title VIII, HUD's alternative is an appeal to the district court.
The preferable approach allows an agency to have final review of its administrative proceedings before they are reviewed by the courts. Nevertheless, the enactment of either administrative scheme would be
immeasurably more effective than the presently weak Fair Housing Act.
While the amendments will refine and clarify other provisions and specify the coverage of Title VIII, 163 the strengthened enforcement provisions
are the most compelling. With provisions for expanded enforcement authority, the Fair Housing Act could be transformed from a national policy
statement favoring equal housing opportunity into an instrument for major change.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While equal opportunity in housing has been national policy for eleven
years, that goal has not yet been realized: the legislation designed to eliminate housing discrimination has proven to be largely unenforceable.
HUD, the department with primary responsibility for enforcing Title VIII,
was granted minimal authority to carry out that responsibility. The Department of Justice also suffers from limitations on its enforcement author161. In Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1975), the court of appeals concluded that a landlord "may seek assurances that prospective

tenants will be able to meet their rental responsibilities." Furthermore, the legislative history of Title VIII indicates that it was not intended to guarantee housing to those unable to
afford it. See, e.g., 114

CONG.

REC. 3421 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale).

162. Cf Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (employment testing);
Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), modied, 549 F.2d 1158 (8th

Cir. 1977) (arrest records). But see EEOC v. Navajo Ref. Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979)
(testing).
163. Another significant provision in S. 506 and H.R. 5200 is to establish a federal policy
prohibiting housing discrimination against handicapped persons. Under H.R. 5200, a handicapped individual may also have the right, within prescribed limits, to retrofit, or modify, a

unit in which he or she desires to live. H.R. 5200, § 804(g)(2)(A)(i), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. 7249 (1979).
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ity as well as lack of resources. Thus, the private suit has emerged as the
only meaningful enforcement provision in Title VIII. However, private
enforcement is an unreasonably cumbersome method for promoting national policy.
It is clear, therefore, that if discriminatory housing practices are to be
curtailed, the principal weakness of Title VIII - specifically, the enforcement provisions - must be amended. The pending Title VIII amendments respond to this weakness with strong and workable administrative
methods for resolution of complaints. If enacted, an amended Title VIII
may signal that equal opportunity in housing is finally within reach.
Michael Steven Bylsma

